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Abstract— Persistent ISR (PISR) systems are a 
potential game-changer for asymmetric warfare. 
Realizing this potential requires delivering actionable 
information when and where it is needed, while 
shielding decision-makers from information overload. 
This paper describes a methodology and prototype 
system for measuring the military value of Persistent 
ISR deployments and allocating ISR assets to 
maximize military value. The approach follows the 
Valued Information at the Right Time (VIRT) 
approach advocated by Hayes-Roth [1]. To any 
tactical scenario supported by a persistent ISR (PISR) 
system, an associated set of high-information world 
events is defined that warrant immediate attention 
from decision makers. Value of a PISR system is 
measured by its ability to detect these conditions of 
interest (COIs) so as to trigger “smart push” 
information operations.  A methodology is presented 
for allocating PISR assets to maximize the ability to 
detect and communicate COIs. 
Keywords - Valued information at the right time; persistent 
ISR; resource alloction; agile procurement; integer 
programming; multi-entity Bayesian networks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A new generation of sensing resources is creating an 
information glut that threatens to overwhelm human 
decision makers. Initial studies suggest that the Valued 
Information at the Right Time (VIRT) approach can raise 
operator productivity, reduce information overload, and 
enhance the performance of information networks [1, 2]. 
In the VIRT appproach, “smart push” operations are 
triggered by the occurrence of Conditions of Interest 
(COIs), or observable events whose occurrence warrants 
immediate attention from decision-makers.  This allows 
human operators to direct their attention where it is most 
needed without having to sift through volumes of 
irrelevant data. Nowhere is VIRT more urgently needed 
than the employment of persistent ISR (PISR) to support 
asymmetric warfare operations. For example, the 
successful mission targeting Abu Musab al Zarquawi 
required hundreds of hours spent analyzing raw data from 
Predator flights [3]. More effective alerting of human 
analysts could dramatically increase the combat 
effectiveness of future such missions. 
 Consider a PISR system deployed in a given tactical 
scenario. A process description of the system specifies 
observables associated with detecting, recognizing, 
identifying and/or tracking entities of interest. These 
observables can be used to define COIs for the tactical 
scenario. In this manner, COIs can be defined for each 
tactical scenario of interest. A PISR system, set of 
associated COIs, and process description is called a 
“PISR deployment.”   
A key question faced by planners is how to allocate a 
set of PISR assets across Forward Operating Bases 
(FOBs) and within the terrain in each FOB Operating 
Region (FOBOR).  Taking the VIRT approach, assets 
should be deployed in a manner that maximizes their 
ability to detect the most important COIs. This is achieved 
by: (1) defining an objective function to represent the 
value of a PISR deployment; (2) identifying constraints 
each deployment must satisfy; and (3) finding a feasible 
optimal or near-optimal allocation of assets into a PISR 
deployment across FOBs and within FOBORs.  
The objective function measures the value of a PISR 
deployment across a set of FOBs and their FOBORs 
given the tactical scenarios, their associated COIs and the 
costs of the PISR components. Measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs) are defined to capture factors of importance to 
decision-makers. These MOEs are included as 
components of the objective function and are weighted 
according to tradeoffs established by decision-makers. 
The objective function estimates the terrain-situated 
performance of a PISR system given its process 
description as actuated in that specific terrain positioning 
of PISR assets. 
The constraints represent conditions that must be 
satisfied by PISR deployments. Constraints define where 
it is permissible to situate PISR assets in or above the 
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terrain. For example, communications must be in place 
between components that send alerts or controls to each 
other; sensors must be within range, possess resolution 
and have a field of view necessary to detect, recognize, 
identify, track and/or communicate as required, etc.  
In addition, the threat must be considered in allocating 
PISR assets. For example, in a C-IED scenario, 
surveillance should be performed along regions where 
attacks are likely to occur; in a HVI scenario, cameras 
should be placed at locations where it is more likely that a 
subject will be in range of the camera. Threat operations 
are modeled as a spatio-temporal stochastic process, 
called the Threat Stochastic Process (TSP). The TSP 
models the likelihood, for each small battle-space region 
and time interval, for each type of Red operation, that the 
given threat operation will take place at that region within 
that interval of time. The objective function weights the 
value of detecting a COI if it occurs by the likelihood that 
the COI will occur.  
A set of PISR assets designed to operate 
collaboratively to detect and report a COI is termed a 
PISR asset admissible configuration (AC).  An 
optimization method is used to find a feasible deployment 
of ACs that maximizes the objective function. Because of 
the dynamic nature of tactical situations, the goal is an 
optimization process that can support agile changes in 
PISR deployment. As the battlespace evolves, the TSP 
should be modified and PISR deployments re-computed.   
II. OVERVIEW 
The objective of the VPR System is to value allocations 
of Persistent ISR (PISR) assets across Forward Operating 
Bases (FOBs) and within the terrain in each FOB 
Operating Region (FOBOR), and to find optimal 
allocations of PISR assets. Allocation is optimized both 
across FOBs and situated in terrain within FOBORs. 
Optimization algorithms are applied to maximize an 
objective function representing the valuation of PISR 
assets. 
The value of a terrain-situated set of PISR assets is 
modeled as a linear function of its ability to detect and 
report Conditions of Interest (COIs) that are incidents of 
the Red scenarios.  
Factors in the objective function weight the relative 
importance of detecting alternative COIs within and 
across threat scenarios. 
A set of PISR assets that are designed to operate 
collaboratively to detect and report a COI are termed a 
PISR asset admissible configuration (AC).  
The probability of detecting and reporting a COI given an 
AC is modeled as the marginal probability of the node in 
a Bayesian network (BN) corresponding to the event that 
the COI is detected and reported.  
The probability of detection is a function of how the PISR 
asset admissible configuration interacts with its 
environment, including the likelihood that an incident of a 
given threat scenario’s type will occur, and the effect of 
the environment on the ability of the PISR assets to detect 
COIs.  
The Threat Stochastic Process (TSP) summarizes the a 
priori likelihood for the space-time locations of relevant 
Red threat activities in a region of interest over a period 
of time. The TSP represents the likelihood of each 
modeled type of threat activity (e.g., IED emplacement, 
patrol ambush, high-valued individual), conditioned by 
terrain suitability, intelligence information (e.g., history of 
Red activity, sympathies of the local populace, 
informatino about typical Red TTPs), expected Blue 
activities (e.g. planned patrols). 
A. Functional Design 
A functional flow diagram of the VPR system is 
shown in Figure 1. The system is divided into operations 
performed off- and online. The TSP and COI detection 
models are developed offline. The online system is 
intended to be interactively operated by a user who is 
determining the number, types, allocation and terrain-
situated assignment of PISR assets across a set of FOBs. 
B. Control-Theoretic Basis for Optimizing Value of 
PISR Resources 
Friendly Forces (FF) surveille a FOBOR (or other 
region), G, for a set of possible COIs, each of which for 
this application is a threat behavior that can create a threat 
incident, i.e. an IED emplacement, an ambush or a HVI.  
For each incident i of a given type within G, there is 
an associated set of observables that can indicate the 
likely presence of the threat.  FF seek to detect the threat 
behaviors via their observables. To detect threat behaviors, 
FF have at their disposal a set A of PISR assets: sensors, 
communicators, processors, and platforms. 
A Total Terrain Situated PSIR Assignment (TTSPA) 
is an assignment Λ(A, G, T) of the members of A to 
locations within G over a time period T with the goal of 
observing all COI observables. Locating an asset within G 
implies that we also have fixed its employment 
parameters: its orientation and coverage, for example.   
The Unconstrained TTSPA (U-TTSPA) is a TTSPA 
that can detect all threat behaviors (via their associated 
observables) within G that will occur during T. 
For a given time interval T, assume we know when 
and where all the threat behaviors that might manifest 
within G will do so. Assume that for each incident i of a 
given type detected by a TTSPA, the system gains a 
payoff for detecting i called the Incident Value, IVim 
specific to the incident’s type m. We define the 
Unconstrained PISR Value as  the sum of all the IVs from 
all the threat types that occur in G during T. 
However, even given a U-TTSPA, it is impossible to 
know with certainty which incidents will occur within G 
during T. The TSP specifies the probability distribution of 
the specific incidents over G during T.  The expected 
value under the TSP of the Unconstrained PISR value is 
called the Unconstrained Expected PISR Value (UEPV).  
The U-TTSPA represents an ideal:  that FF has as 
many perfect sensors as needed to guarantee detection of 
any observable that might occur with G. In actuality, any 
ISR asset set set A will be limited in both quantity and 
capability. The following constraints apply to TTSPA in 
real-world military scenarios: 
• Sensors are limited in number, in range, in ability 
to detect observables even within their range, in 
endurance, environment, subject to threat counters, 
and are prone to false alarms. 
• Communicators  are limited in number, range, data 
throughput, time delay, endurance, by the 
environment, and are subject to threat counters. 
• Processors  are limited in number, processing 
throughput, reasoning capacity, errors, endurance, 
by the environment, and are subject to threat 
counters. 
• Platforms  are limited in number, maneuver, 
endurance, by the environment, and are subject to 
threat counters. 
A Constrained TTSPA (C-TTSPA) is an assignment 
of the limited elements in A over G for the period T. An 
optimal assigment maximizes the Constrained Expected 
PISR Value (CEPV).  In the U-TTSPA case, observables 
were detected with probability 1.  In the C-TTSPA case, 
we must account not just for the likelihood of the incident 
manifesting at a particular point within G during T, but 
must now also account for the likelihood of the incident’s 
observable being detected by the C-TTSPA.   
The difference between UEPV and CEPV is termed 
the “PISR Gap”.  A metric for any C-TTSPA is the 
percent PISR Gap:  [(UEPV – CEPV)/UEPV] x 100%. 
Clearly, maximizing CEPV minimizes the PISR Gap. A 
C-TTSPA that minimizes the PISR Gap is an optimal C-
TTSPA. 
Given a threat incident probability distribution over G 
and time period T, the objective is to determine the 
optimal C-TTSPA:  the assignment(s) that maximize 
CEPV over all the feasible assignments Λ. 
We followed a spiral development process in 
developing the optimization model. The initial spiral, 
which produces an optimal solution for a small, highly 
constrained problem. Subsequent spirals have increased 
the problem size, relaxed constraints and introduced 
additional complexities. For the first few spirals, in which 
optimal solutions are possible in short runtimes, we 
employed commercial off-the-shelf software, such as 
MPL, AMPL and CPLEX. In later spirals, as the problem 
 




outgrows the capabilities of commercial software to solve 
the formulation in acceptable runtime, it will be necessary 
to adopt alternative heuristic approaches.  
III. COMPONENTS 
A. PISR System Workflows 
A PISR system is any configuration of PISR assets 
that is defined by tactical users to be a “system”. In 
practice this varies widely from individual PISR 
components such as a binocular imaging/video camera 
system manned by a warfighter, to complex systems of 
systems involving coordination of dozens of separate 
sensors, communication devices, networks and stationary 
and mobile platforms.  
Regardless of the complexity of a PISR system, its 
usage in practice implicitly determines a formal workflow 
representation of how its components operate and inter-
operate to accomplish the missions for which the PISR 
system is configured and employed.  
Although the workflow of a specific PISR system can 
be complex, it is conceptually simple in that it is always a 
concatenation of elements that are essentially 
communications between any pair of: sensor, sensor 
platform, sensor controller, platform controller, 
exploitation module, communication device, user control 
panel or a user. Here a user is a warfighter playing any 
number of roles as an analyst, operator, controller, etc. 
We can abstract the essential processes of a PISR 
system to these: 
• Sensor scan; 
• Control sensor, e.g., turn sensor on or off or re-
point sensor; 
• Move platform, e.g., fly a UAV or relocate a 
SMSS; 
• Exploit signal, e.g.: (i) UGS detecting a vehicle, its 
locating, speed or stopping; (ii) AEDT module 
recognizing humans dismounting from a vehicle; 
(iii) face recognition module recognizing a HVI; 
• Send message, e.g.: (i) sensor sending an alert to a 
communication device, usually a radio; (ii) 
exploitation module sending information to a 
communication device; (iii) communication device 
repeating an alert or message to another 
communication device; (iv) communication device 
sending information to a user display; (v) 
communication device sending information to a 
user; (vi) user sending a control signal to a 
communication device; (vii)  communication 
device sending a control signal to a platform; (viii) 
communication device sending a control signal to a 
sensor 
• Display message, i.e., alert user. 
This level of abstraction of PISR system workflow is 
useful to produce generic configurations of PISR assets 
that form different sorts of PISR systems. For example, 
Figure 2 shows three different generic PISR workflow 
configurations. 
A configuration of PISR assets is a PISR system that is 
constructed by incrementally assembling PISR 
components (which can themselves be systems) such that 
the resulting PISR system has a well-defined workflow.  
In the VPR context, detecting and reporting of COIs 
defines the top-level mission for any PISR system. 
Therefore, for the purposes of the VPR design, we define 
a PISR configuration to be “admissible” if its workflow is 
capable of detecting and reporting a COI.  
Generally speaking, except for a user, there are few 
fielded capabilities that can reliably recognize an incident 
corresponding to a COI, i.e. an IED emplacement, 
preparation for an ambush or recognize an HVI. 
Therefore we interpret “detecting a COI” to mean that an 
observable is detected that is evidential to the occurrence 
of a COI.  
To detect emplacement of an IED we must have a sensor 
or combination of sensor and exploitation module that can 
detect observables that are evidential to an IED 
emplacement. In a sufficiently isolated area such 
observables include, for example, a vehicle stopping 
and/or persons dismounting from a stopped vehicle. 
It is important that an admissible configuration (AC) 
includes not only one or more processes for detecting a 
COI but also one or more process for reporting a COI to a 
user. A COI is considered to be reported if evidence of a 
possible occurrence of a COI is successfully sent to a 
manned platform of any type, or to a display intended to 
alert a user.  
For example, an unattended ground sensor (UGS) can 
detect a vehicle stopping. Therefore it is capable of 
detecting an IED or an ambush, because a vehicle 
stopping in a non-urban location can be evidential to 
those incidents. However even though an UGS is a PISR 
system, an UGS by itself is not an AC because it does not 
send its detection message to a user.  
The simplest AC containing an UGS must include a radio 
and a ground station such as a Squad Mission Support 
System (SMSS) vehicle that can receive the UGS radio 
signal. The PISR configuration UGS->Radio->SMSS is 
an AC.  
To optimize effective usage of PISR assets in the net-
centric battle environment we would like a capability to 
dynamically configure plug-and-play PISR assets into 
ACs, in order to have the greatest flexibility to deploy 
them to achieve maximum value to the warfighter.  
The formal XPDL semantics for workflow specified 
by the Workflow Management Coalition provide a 
standardized workflow representation methodology and 
implementation [4]. In theory this could be used in 
concert with a product line architecture (PLA) to produce 
a rigorous workflow representation with each PISR 
system configured under the PLA [5]. 
B. COI Detection & Reporting Probability Model 
In order to value an AC as it is assigned to specific 
terrain, we must be able to estimate the probability that 
the AC as situated can detect and report a COI. This is 
accomplished by mapping the AC workflow to a 
probability model representing the chain of events 
resulting in reporting a COI. The probability model is 
specified as a Bayesian network (BN). An example BN is 
shown in Figure 3. Each consecutive pair of PISR assets 
in the AC workflow is mapped to parent-child pair of 
nodes in the BN. A conditional probability is specified for 
the event that the second asset in the pair triggers, given 
that the first asset has triggered. For our prototype system, 
the Bayesian networks were hand-constructed. The 
Bayesian networks for different admissible configurations 
involve combination of repeatable fragments, and are 
naturally represented as Multi-Entity Bayesian Network 
Fragments (MFrags), which can be assembled into 
situation-specific Bayesian networks (SSBN) [6]. Figure 
3 shows an example of the transformation from AC 
workflow to SSBN.  After SSBN construction, a standard 
BN inference algorithm can be used to calculate the 
likelihood of detecting and reporting the COI associated 
with the SSBN.  
The term Pdm,ac,sz,t  represents the probability that asset 
configuration ac, operating in zone sz, would detect the 
presence of an incident of type m (e.g., IED emplacement) 
during a time period t, given that an incident of type m 
occurred in sz during t. The steps in the construction of a 
SSBN used to calculate Pdm,ac,sz,t are described below: 
1. A separate SSBN is generated for each 
combination of incident type, surveillance zone, 
time period, and asset configuration that can 
surveil sz in time period t and detect COIs 
indicative of the incident type (note we assume 
that just one asset configuration is assigned to a 
surveillance zone per time period; multiple asset 
configurations operating in a single surveillance 
zone are considered to constitute a single, larger 
configuration). Therefore, the first step in the 
construction of a BN is to specify the incident 
type, surveillance zone, time period and asset 
configuration. 
 
Figure 2  Generic PISR System Workflows 
2. A root node for the BN is created, labeled 
“Occurred(m, sz, t)”, which represents presence or 
absence of an incident of type m in sz during t. 
3. We next construct a root node for each admissible 
configuration that meets constraints for the 
surveillance zone.  These nodes are labeled 
ConfigurationOperational(ac, sz, t). Exactly one 
of these nodes is set to True for each surveillance 
zone and time period, indicating the admissible 
configuration that is assigned to the surveillance 
zone during that time period.  All others are set to 
False. 
4. The surveillance zone incorporates terrain 
features (e.g., elevation, vegetation) that affect the 
probability that each ISR asset will function 
properly in sz. The BN, therefore, includes a node 
labeled TerrainType(sz), which incorporates 
states reflecting the various terrain types that 
might occur in sz. The terrain type node is set to 
the state that applies. 
5. As described in section 4.1, each AC is composed 
of one or more components that have various 
functions (sensing, cuing, etc.), linked together to 
operate in series to detect and report the Incident. 
We assume that all of the components in ac must 
function correctly in order for ac to report the 
occurrence of an incident. Correct functioning of 
a component (which we refer to as “triggering”) 
includes receiving a signal from the previous 
component in the ac series and performing any 
specific functions applicable to the (e.g., tracking), 
and forwarding a signal to the next serial 
component (if any) in ac. To model the 
probability that an asset configuration detects and 
reports an indident, we add to the SSBN a set of 
nodes representing the components of each asset 
configuration. These nodes are labeled 
Triggered(k, acj, sz, t) where k refers to a 
component of asset configuration ac. This node 
indicates whether or not the kth component in ac 
is triggered in surveillance zone sz during time 
interval t. The first such node is populated with 
the conditional probabilities that the component is 
or is not triggered given that the incident type that 
ac is able to detect occurs; if ac is not operational, 
then the first component does not trigger. The 
remaining such nodes are populated with the 
conditional probabilities that the component is or 
is not triggered given that the previous component 
triggered; the component is assumed not to trigger 
if its parent component does not trigger. As 
appropriate, these nodes may also be conditioned 
on terrain. Note that the conditional probabilities 
include the probabilities of false alarm. These 
probabilities would be provided through a 
combination of manufacturer’s specifications for 
the ISR equipment and experience of the 
collections manager in using the ISR equipment. 
Figure Figure 4 shows the conditional probability 
table for one of the Triggered(k, ac, sz, t) nodes. 
6. The prototype implementation did not consider 
 
Figure 3: Admissible Configuration Workflow to Bayesian Network 
lighting conditions or weather; these could be 
modeled by adding additional nodes to the SSBN. 
7. After all of the Triggered(k, ac, sz, t) nodes have 
been created, a final node is created, labeled 
Detected(m, sz, t), which combines the results of 
the individual components of the admissible 
configuration that is operational, into an overall 
determination of whether the threat incident of the 
type m was detected and reported by the 
admissible system being deployed to detect the 
incident in sz during time period t. The parent 
nodes of the IncidentDetected node are the final 
Triggered(k, ac, sz, t) nodes from each of the 
admissible configurations ac. We assume that if 
and only if the final component of the operational 
admissible configuration ac was triggered 
properly, then ac detected and reported the 
incident. Therefore, the Detected(m, sz, t) node 
registers True if and only if the parent Triggered(k, 
ac, sz, t) node of the operational admissible 
configuration registers True. 
8. All these nodes are combined into a Bayesian 
network. The probability of True shown in the 
IncidentDetected node is the probability of 
detection of the incident given that it is present 
and that the admissible configuration assigned 
value True is being deployed in sz during t. 
An example SSBN is shown in Figure 5, for a 
scenario in which AC#11 and AC#12 may be operational 
in SZ#300 during time period T1, to detect IED 
emplacements.  To obtain from the BN the probability 
that the incident has been detected given that it has 
occurred, we set the ConfigurationOperational(ac, sz, t) to 
True for the operational configuration (AC#12 in this 
example) and False for the others, set the appropriate 
terrain type node (agricultural in this example), and set 
the Occurred(IEDEmplacement) node to True. 
C. Threat Stochastic Process 
In order to utilize PISR assets to maximum value it is 
necessary to have a model of how likely COIs are  to 
occur over space and time. The standard military process 
for determining this is called Intelligence Preparation of 
the Battlefield (IPB).  While IPB is well-developed as a 
craft, it does not have a formal mathematical basis for 
specifying prior probabilities of Red activities.  
By mapping an IPB-like process into a spatio-
temporal mathematical model, threat likelihoods can be 
continuously updated as the battlespace evolves.  
We have developed a representation called the Threat 
Stochastic Process (TSP) that summarizes the a priori 
likelihood of relevant red threat activities for a period of 
time going forward. It depends on mission and Blue 
operations, and is conditioned on expected Blue activities, 
e.g. planned patrols. 
The TSP is fundamentally spatial, i.e. geographic, 
incorporating:  
• Terrain features: elevation, ground cover, hydrol-
ogy, roads, etc. as they affect Red’s preference for 
sites to perpetrate threat incident (e.g. where to 
emplace IED) 
• History of Red threat activities and incidents (e.g. 
IED emplacements, ambushes) 
• Red location estimates (e.g. populations, camps, 
safe houses, red logistical stores, etc.) 
• Blue operations plans (usually at a general level). 
TSP can also incorporate relevant temporal environ-
mental effects such as time of day (illumination), time of 
year (weather), cultural effects (rites, events) and the 
effect on anticipated red activities of bomb damage or 
other battlefield effects. 
The TSP can be the output of a Red threat prediction 
or other estimation procedure as long as that procedure 
and its output is consistent with the mathematical and 
scientific constraints of the TSP representation. 
Figure 6 shows an example IED likelihood map 
 
Figure 4  Triggered(k, ac, sz, t) Node and its Parent Nodes 
around three notional FOBs. Note that the likelihood is 
concentrated on the road network, because IEDs occur 
primarily on roads.  Other types of threat would show 
different spatial patterns. 
D. PISR Asset Value Optimization 
The approach for measuring the value of a TTSPA is 
to calculate the expected value of assigning available 
PISR assets to specified surveillance zones within the 
region of interest, which can be, for example, the 
operating area for one FOB or for multiple FOBs.  The 
expected value of assignment of PISR assets to terrain 
locations is calculated based on three factors:  
• Vector of probabilities of occurrence of the threat 
activities within the surveillance zone; 
• Matrix of probabilities of detection by the 
admissible configurations of PISR assets given 
threat incidents, within the surveillance zone; and  
• Vector of values for successful detection of a threat 
instance for that surveillance zone.  
The theory is based on a rational choice model that 
given the opportunity we should prefer the PISR assets 
assignment that maximizes aggregate expected value. 
This can be viewed as a case of the Assignment 
Problem [7]:  to find the optimal matching  on a bipartite 
graph with weighted edges.  A matching on a graph G is a 
set of non-adjacent edges.  A bi-partite graph is a graph 
that can be partitioned into two sets of nodes, where 
within a set the nodes are not adjacent.  In this case, the 
two sets of nodes are the PISR assets and the surveillance 
zones.  The weights on the edges represent the expected 
assignment values.  We wish the find the matching that 
assigns assets to zones so that the total expected 
assignment value is maximized. 
Let a be the number of assets and s be the number of 
surveillance zones.  It is reasonable to assume that s >> a.  
A brute force approach would require considering the 
permutations of a list of length a chosen from s.  For 100 
surveillance zones and 10 assets, that would require 
considering 6.3e+19 alternatives. 
Efficient polynomial algorithms from network theory 
exist for exactly solving the assignment problem:  
including the: 
• Hungarian algorithm  
• Variations on Djikstra’s shortest path, and  
• Augmented flow algorithms.  
However, the PISR asset assignment problem has 
complications, to include considering configurations of 
multiple PISR assets and configurations that cover more 
than one surveillance zone. Representing these 
possibilities requires constraints that take the solution 
beyond the reach of these polynomial run-time algorithms. 
The algorithms and tools that we choose to employ in 
 
Figure 5: Constructed Bayesian Network 
order to determine the TTSPA depend on several factors, 
including: 
• Problem size - the numbers of available 
components, admissible configurations, minimal 
surveillance zones, and time periods will affect the 
number of assignment variables for which it is 
necessary to solve  
• Assignment constraints – a spiral development 
approach to building an optimization model 
progresses from tight constraints that come from 
simplifying assumptions (e.g. one admissible 
configuration per surveillance zone and one 
surveillance zone per admissible configuration) to 
more practical constraints. 
• Solution accuracy required – certain approaches 
may produce good, but not optimal assignment 
solutions in a short runtime.  If operational 
conditions permit a longer runtime, a broader 
group of approaches is possible, including those 
guaranteed to produce optimal solutions. 
When conditions permit use of a mathematical 
programming approach to solve the TTSPA, we use a 
binary integer program formulation of the assignment 
problem with side constraints, in which decision variables 
are equal to 1 when a specified component or admissible 
configuration is assigned to a specified surveillance zone 
in a given time period and 0 otherwise.   
The basic integer programming algorithm employs a 
search-tree approach, implicitly enumerating the search 
space. Algorithm advancements have accelerated the 
search by identifying structure within the problem from 
which to generate cuts that rapidly prune the tree. This 
approach is guaranteed to yield provably optimal 
solutions. However, integer programming in general 
yields solution times that are exponential as a function of 
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the problem size. Thus for very large problems, the 
solution times may become prohibitive.  Then it is 
necessary to have a means to identify feasible solutions to 
search heuristically. 
Heuristic algorithms explore the search space of 
solutions without guaranteeing that an optimal solution is 
found. Typically they can be guaranteed to return 
solutions within a fixed period of time. Heuristic 
algorithms include several families of approaches: 
• greedy search 
• tabu search 
• simulated annealing 
• genetic and other evolutionary algorithms 
• particle swarm algorithms 
• memetic algorithms. 
These approaches often yield results sufficient for 
their application purposes. However, the algorithms do 
not provide any information on the relative goodness of 
the solution generated in comparison with the optimal 
solution.  Therefore, the integer programming formulation 
remains a critical tool for benchmarking the speed and 
degree of optimality of solutions obtained.   
Sophisticated approaches to solving integer programs 
have combined the two, using heuristics to find good 
feasible starting solutions, and allowing the integer 
program to find an optimal solution.  Commercial 
packages such as CPLEX employ some form of heuristic 
search as part of pre-processing of the problem before 
employing integer programming methods. 
For this problem, other conceptual approaches may 
exist, such as employing a polynomial matching 
algorithm combined with a Lagrangian approach that 
penalizes infeasibilities and iterates towards a feasible 
solution. Commercial software is generally not available 
for these hybrid approaches, so substantial additional 
programming and development time and resources would 
be required to implement them. 
For any heuristic approach chosen, the mathematical 
programming approach will remain critical for 
benchmarking the performance of the given heuristic 
using a set of test problems. Using the optimal benchmark, 
it is possible to make well-founded statements about the 
relative goodness of a given heuristic solution. 
IV. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
A prototype system was implemented to demonstrate 
feasibility of the approach. Figure 7 shows the flow of 
input data and output results through the VPR system. 
The input control panel is an Excel file used to input data 
for available asset quantities, detection probabilities for 
admissible configurations, and the relative value to Blue 
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of the different COIs.  The ArcGIS preprocessor is used 
to generate the threat stochastic process, to identify the 
surveillance zones and FOBs, and to incorporate distance, 
line-of-sight, location adjustments to the COI values 
defined in the input control panel, and terrain adjustments 
to detection probabilities. The Excel preprocessor accepts 
inputs from the input control panel and ArcGIS 
preprocessor, and produces output suitable for use by the 
MPL/CPLEX optimization solver. The MPL/CPLEX 
solver finds the optimal way to configure assets into 
admissible asset configurations and assign them to 
surveillance zones. The Excel output file accepts 
MPL/CPLEX output and produces a table showing the 
number of SZs surveilled by each AC within each 
FOBOR. These outputs are then read into ArcMAP to 
display the results on a map. 
V. EXPERIMENTS 
A series of experiments was designed and conducted 
to examine the performance of the VPR methodology. 
A. Objectives 
Experiments were performed to: (i) assess practical 
limits on the number and size of the input parameters the 
optimization model can handle; (ii) quantify the benefit 
gained from optimal PISR assignments, compared to 
realistic simulated manual approaches; and (iii) study the 
effect of limiting the budget available for purchase of 
PISR assets. 
B. Metrics 
Metrics for the first objective were (1) the time 
required to load input data into the solver, and (2) the time 
required by the solver to identify the optimal assignment 
solution. We assume valid results are produced by the 
solver. 
The primary metric for the second objective is the 
Constrained Expected PISR Value (CEPV). The method 
of analysis is to compare the CEPV for the optimal asset 
assignment to the CEPV for suboptimal assignment 
approaches. The ratio of the CEPV values quantifies the 
incremental value produced by VPR. 
For the third objective, the CEPV is used to measure 
the value of optimal PISR assignments achievable with a 
given dollar investment in PISR assets. The ratio of 
CEPV for different budget levels indicates the relative 
value provided by the assets purchased under each of the 
budgets.  
C. Experiments 
We performed optimization runs on a base case of 
6,178 SZs, each measuring 300m x 300m. To investigate 
scalability, we ran excursions that increased the number 
of surveillance zones, as described below.  We used a 
fixed set of components, a basic quantity of each 
component, and a fixed set of 29 admissible 
configurations. We defined three notional FOBs in the 
vicinity of Camp Roberts, CA, and used the actual terrain 
around these FOBs to determine roads, adjust detection 
probabilities for terrain, and define the threat stochastic 
process. For the experiments, we used one Condition of 
Interest, IED detection.  
To quantify the value added by VPR, we compared 
the optimal asset assignment with a heuristic we 
developed to simulate the manual process used by humans 
to allocate PISR components across a group of FOBs, 
assemble the components into admissible configurations, 
and assign the resulting configurations to surveillance 
zones. We then compared the resulting CEPV to the 
CEPV produced by PISR assignments using VPR. The 
heuristic allocates assets in proportion to the number of 
Blue personnel assigned to a FOB, creates ACs to 
maximize the number of SZs that can be monitored, and 
assigns ACs to SZs with the highest probability of IED 
emplacement. 
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To determine the effect of budget constraints on 
CEPV, we assigned a dollar cost to each component, and 
added a total dollar budget constraint to VPR. CEPVs 
were calculated under various budget limit scenarios. We 
then studied the resulting CEPVs as a function of budget 
limit. 
D. Results 
We consider each of the three objectives in turn. 
Estimate Model Limits. We investigated scaling by 
shrinking the size of each SZ, resulting in a larger number 
of SZs and a correspondingly larger number of variables 
nd constraints.  In addition to the base case of 6,178 SZs 
measuring 300m x 300m, we ran a case with 24,712 SZs 
measuring 150m x 150m, and 55,602 SZs measuring 
100m x 100m.  Figure 8 shows solver run times as a 
function of the number of SZs. Experiments were run on a 
Macbook Pro with 4GB RAM, solving the VPR problem 
via AMPL/Gurobi 3.0 optimization solver within a 
Parallels Windows XP virtual machine. We fit a low-
degree polynomial to the data to extrapolate runtime for 
larger problems. We expect that, with a sufficiently 
powerful computer, most problems involving a practical 
number of surveillance zones could be handled. We did 
not vary the number of different components or ACs, or 
the quantity of each component, which could affect 
runtime. These variations could be pursued in future 
research. 
For the experimental conditions, the graph shows that 
grid widths in the 200m – 300m range would appear to 
offer a good combination of resolution and runtime, wth 
runtimes of under 5 minutes. Different PISR assets may 
be better-suited to different-sized surveillance zones, so 
the mix of PISR assets to be optimized might affect the 
selection of grid width as well.  
Another practical consideration is the time available 
for a PISR asset collections manager to run an 
optimization like VPR. In some situations, available 
runtime may be quite short, in which case it might not be 
practical to use small grid-widths. Smaller grid widths 
permit more precise positioning of PISR assets, so it 
would seem to be advantageous to use smaller grid widths, 
if possible.  This may have the downside, however, of 
being susceptible to inaccuracies in the geo-spatial data at 
this level of resolution. 
Quantify Value Added by VPR. The CEPV generated 
by VPR, along with the heuristic-generated CEPVs using 
various percentages of top-TSP SZs, are shown in Table 1. 
The heuristic-generated CEPV using the top X% of 
SZs by TSP assumes that the human attempts to identify 
the optimal n SZs to surveille in a given FOB, and that he 
uses his perception of TSP as the basis for selecting the 
SZs. We assume that the human is not able to identify the 
top n SZs, but rather, a set of n SZs, the mean TSP of 
which matches the mean TSP of the highest X% of SZs. 
Thus, a very skilled human might identify SZs the mean 
TSP of which is the same as that of the top 1% of SZs by 
TSP. Random assignment of ACs to SZs would be 
expected to result in mean TSP value equal to that of all 
of the SZs (i.e., the top 100%).   
There is a positive correlation between TSP for a SZ 
and the expected assignment value (EAV) for the SZ 
Recall that EAV is the product of TSP, probability of 
detection of a COI by an AC in the SZ, and the Value of 
the threat type occurring in the SZ. Terrain features of the 
SZ, especially distance from the FOB, affect all three of 
these values, which increases the correlation between TSP 
and EAV. Nevertheless, the correlation is less than 1.0, so 
selection of the top-TSP zones does not equate directly to 
selection of the top-EAV zones. VPR is able to identify 
the top SZs by EAV but the human is assumed not to 
possess this capability. Because of this advantage, as well 
as its ability to optimize the component-allocaton and AC 
assembly processes, VPR is able to produce a higher 
CEPV than can the heuristic process. In this experiment, 
VPR out-performs the heuristic by 340% to 690%, 
depending on the assumed ability of the human to identify 
top-TSP SZs. 
Determine Effect of Budget Constraints. A final set of 
experiments was performed to determine the optimal mix 
of PISR assets for a given level of dollar investment. 
Using notional cost data for PISR assets, we selected a 
maximum (“Baseline”) number of each of 14 PISR assets 
that are available for purchase. With a $13.5B budget, all 
the assets can be purchased. With a smaller budget, one 
must select some percentage of the maximum number of 
each component to purchase. We choose to purchase 
those assets that will maximum CEPV under optimal SZ 
assignment of the ACs that can be assembled using the 
assets purchased. Using alternative budget values ranging 
from $250,000 to $16,000,000, we used VPR to 
determine the optimal asset mix. The resulting CEPV 
values as a function of The budget are graphed and shown 
in Figure 9. As expected, returns diminish as the budget is 
increased.  
Of interest is how the asset mix changes as the budget 
changes. At small budget levels, the GBOSS, GBLite and 
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UAV are not affordable relative to the value they generate 
based on the notional values used for this experiment. The 
less expensive assets are fully utilized (i.e. 100% are 
purchased) at even the lowest budget levels tested. 
This type of analysis could prove useful in PISR asset 
acquisition and deployment exercises. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A methodology was developed and prototype system 
implemented for valuing persistent ISR deployments and 
allocating PISR assets across FOBs and in terrain within 
FOBORs.  Experiments indicate that optimal allocations 
can be found in minutes, freeing human operators from 
the tedious manual process of constructing allocations. 
The approach is practical for problems of reasonable size, 
and can scale to very large problems if heuristic 
optimization methods are used. The methodology can be 
used both to deploy existing assets and to prioritize 
acquisition of additional assets. The methodology is 
suitable for rapid modification of allocations to support 
agile deployment in a changing environment and rapid 
procurement to meet changing conditions on the ground. 
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